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HE PERPLEXING AND ALMOST ENDLESS discussions which seem to

ensue whenever moralists and ethicians treat with lawyers about
natural law and its juridical value have become almost proverbial. Moralists and ethicians vigorously defend the juridical value of natural law,
while lawyers equally vigorously deny it. This happens not only when
the lawyers are of the type who are unwilling to recognize natural law
or any other absolute ethical norm, either because of their own moral
indifference or because of a false philosophical doctrine. These lawyers
need not detain us here. But also, one often finds very reputable lawyers,
even good Christians, who defend some sort of juridical "positivism."
In my experience, however, it seems that time and again discussions of
this sort prove fruitless, not because their opinions do not agree with the
objective truth, but because the disputants, using words and concepts
in a different sense, are seemingly contradicting each other, while in
reality the opinions they are expressing are not in conffict,,but beside
the question.
For those who maintain that all law is positive by no means wish to
deny the existence of norms of ethics which oblige the conscience absolutely. They admit that even in the matter of justice there are principles
which, independently of any positive law or even contrary to positive
tin the original, this article appeared as De "Positivismo" Quodam Juridico Nota
Practica,Tom. XLVIII, Fasc. I PERIODICA 77-100.
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law, should be kept inviolate. They admit
that among the ends and motives of positive
law the preservation of justice and equity
holds a prominent place. ,
Furthermore, they themselves attribute
an ethical force to just positive laws, to
the extent that precepts given to subjects
by legitimate authority bind the subjects
in conscience to carry out the precepts.
Further, according to those positivists, the
legislator in drafting laws is required to consider the norms of justice and equity, and
in general of all decency. If the legislator
has not done that but has prescribed something unjust, it would not oblige the subjects in conscience; indeed, they would be
bound to resist the law. Moreover, those
lawyers, if they are Catholics, will readily
grant to moralists and canonists that Catholics are bound in conscience to execute last
wills made in favor of charitable causes,
even if the formalities requisite for validity
in civil law are missing; and that in conscience civil divorce has no value, etc. In
a word, whatever ethics or moral theology
teaches about objective truth, Catholic
lawyers, recognizing its normative value,
staunchly support.
The only point at issue with such positivists is whether or not what is ethical
in law should itself even be called law,
that is, whether it should be subsumed
under the notion of law, or, rather, under
the notion of ethics or moral theology.
These positivists do not deny that natural
law exists, obligates, and has value, but they
deny that it may fittingly be called law.'
1 In their denial they use the word law as the object of juridical science. The word will be taken
in this sense throughout the entire course of this
article. For there is question not of whether men
have true and proper rights from the nature of
things themselves, but whether it would be suit-
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In like manner, they do not reduce to the
concept of law the ethical value inherent
in positive law established by statutes,
custom, or the repeated decisions of judges;
but they leave to ethics that element with
which moralists, not the lawyers, should
deal.
They say that law, in its true and proper
sense, the formal object of juridical science,
should be distinguished from its ethical
aspect which pertains to the formal object
of another science. Law consists, they say,
in a set of norms which define how public
authority and its juridical and administrative agencies work in the event of certain
actions and omissions by the citizens (or
other facts) which are called juridical because they have effects recognized by public authority and rendered secure by its
agencies, using even coercion. Juridical
science is the ordered and systematic
knowledge of these norms and their effects.
This law and juridical science, it is held,
are wholly positive since they omit the
consideration of the ethical aspects of law
without, to reiterate, in any way disparaging or denying those aspects. On the contrary, these aspects are considered of
greater importance and value than even
positive juridical norms in the strict sense.
Put thusly, the question is not one of
objective truth but of the means by which
that truth may be more aptly expressed in
our concepts. It is a question of methodology, not of ontology. That is, is it actuable to subsume these rights, as such, under the
object of juridical sciences. The word law taken
absolutely may be used in two ways: first, for
signifying the ethical law; and second, the positive
law. Here, rather, the treatment concerns the word
used in the relative sense, as the science of law,
the study of law, lawyer, legal aspect, etc. (This
note, though it does not appear in the original,
was added at the instruction of the author.)
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ally more fitting to treat ethical elements
and the judgments of ethics under the notion of law and juridical science, or rather
to restrict law and juridical science to positive norms, leaving ethical judgments to the
sciences of ethics and moral theology?
It seems reasonable to conclude that the
juridical positivism which many Christian
civil lawyers defend is methodological, not
ontological.
To clarify this juridical positivism, let us
look at a concrete example. Many modern
codes of law permit divorce. Those positive
codes establish the requisite conditions
which, once fulfilled, enable both husband
and wife or either of them to seek and obtain from a judge an absolute divorce, so
that rights and obligations flowing from
that bond can no longer be invoked before
a public authority. Moralists and students
of Christian ethics will say that such a
divorce does not exist; that it has no juridical effect since public authority has no
right to dissolve marriages. A Catholic
lawyer who is a "positivist," as far as the
objective truth is concerned, will dissent in
no particular from the moralist; he differs
only in the manner in which he conceives
that truth, and in the words he uses to express it. He will say that no ruler has the
moral power of proposing a divorce law;
that husband and wife, notwithstanding a
decree of divorce by the judge, are bound
in conscience by the matrimonial contract,
and that they are also obliged to refrain
from contracting another marriage; that
a new marriage contract, if one be attempted, has no moral value, etc. All these,
however, are not juridical judgments, but
ethical; and to the extent that they view the
rights and mutual obligations of husband
and wife they are, indeed, judgments of
the highest value which husband and wife

are strictly bound to observe. Divorce,
however, is a positive law; for, once the
decree is rendered, divorce, not marriage,
is the norm which public authority and its
agencies follow. In fact, to safeguard this
norm they can even invoke public means
of coercion. To deny the juridical value of
divorce is to deny an evident fact, for its
value consists solely in an assurance of the
intervention of public agencies. It is the
business of a lawyer to have an exact and
ordered knowledge of these laws, their conditions, and their effects. To be sure, a
lawyer should use this knowledge for good,
not evil; the knowledge itself, however, is
neither good nor evil, but merely a knowledge of facts.
If the reader has followed the discussion
closely thus far, he now understands that
neither juridical positivism, taken in the
sense in which we have used it, nor the
doctrine of natural law can be said to be
true or false. The sole question at issue is
whether it is methodologically more fitting
to select one or the other method of expressing the same reality.
But there is no dearth of reasons which
seem to urge the method of juridical positivism, especially if the matter is considered from the standpoint of lawyers.
Lawyers who are engaged in practice
as advocates, trustees, judges, public officials, house counsel for commercial business firms, tax experts, executors, and the
like, by virtue of their work, or in their
professional capacity, concern themselves
solely with solving questions of positive
law. They themselves are, of course, bound
to observe ethical professional norms just
as those whom they advise. But in so far as
they are jurists, they do not give ethical
advice, and their clients do not seek such
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advice from them. If doubts arise about the
moral licitness of their actions, lawyers
commonly consult moralists or send their
clients to them. What does this imply but
that ethical norms (the norms of natural
law not excluded) do not pertain to the
law of jurists, or that the formal object of
their science and special competence is not
natural law, but positive law?
Now that, and nothing more, is what
many reputable Christian jurists intend to
say if they maintain that natural law is not
law in the true and proper sense, or if they
deny that natural law has juridical value.
Indeed, very often they intend to affirm no
more if they say that natural law does not
exist, even though they signify their opinion
at the time in words which are utterly inept
and in themselves destined to create confusion. Their real intention, however, is
to affirm that what is usually called natural
law certainly exists, but is not aptly termed
law, or that it is termed law only by analogy. This is not to say that that intention
is always clearly conceived by those jurists;
on the contrary, very often it is not. It
seems, however, that such an intention is
in harmony with their thought, and that
they would agree with such an interpretation if it were explained to them.
Civil lawyers, especially those practicing
private civil law, who not only engage in
practice but whose particular duty it is to
teach and develop the juridical science,
experience somewhat greater difficulties in
admitting the juridical character of natural
law. For the method by which fundamental
concepts are formulated, especially in mod2m teaching, is worlds apart from the
method which ethics and moral theology
follow in defining their notions.
For example, let us take the notion of
bligation. Juridical science cannot operate

CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

1961

with the notion of a moral duty of doing
or omitting something; still less can the
science of private patrimonial law. The
elements which constitute a kind of juridical obligation are several. In the first place,
there is a requirement that a given precept
proceed frdm one of the sources of positive
law, such as statute, custom, or judicial decision. Not infrequently, even a source of
positive law, by ordering something or
establishing a norm, has recourse to an
ethical norm such as good morals, equity,
decency, good faith, etc.; but one cannot
appeal to these norms in law except through
some source of positive law,. which is itself
recognized by positive law.
Further, it is necessary that the nonfulfillment of a precept have a juridical effect;
without this, no juridical obligation can be
conceived. That effect can be another subsidiary precept of law, by dint of which
one who did not fulfill the primary obligation contracts a secondary obligation,
namely, that of making restitution to the
creditor for any damage arising from an
unfulfilled obligation, or of paying him a
certain sum of money as damages. The
effect of nonfulfillment can also be that the
creditor gains the right to invoke the aid
of public authority, which uses its own
power of coercion to force the debtor, by
direct or indirect means, to fulfill the obligation. Furthermore, there are or can be
other effects of nonfulfillment: the debtor
loses certain rights such as using his own
property which the creditor possesses and
can retain, exacting counter-performance
in bilateral contracts; or finally, the loss of
her right to support by a wife who does not
observe the obligation of married life, etc.
Then too, it is characteristic of a juridical patrimonial obligation to be supplemented by a secondary obligation, such as
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suretyship, pledge, or mortgage; or to be
susceptible of new causes of action or to
the change of an existing cause of action
to a new cause of action; or to render
valid the transfer of a right brought about
by an obligation; or to cause the payment
of a debt to be considered the fulfillment of
an obligation (not an optional act) because, again, it carries with it numerous
juridical effects.
If these positive elements which constitute juridical obligation are lacking, there
can be a moral duty of doing or omitting
something, but not a juridical duty. Obligations which arise from a source other
than those of positive law, to which positive
law grants no cause of action and gives no
juridical effect, would not properly be called
juridical obligations. For the transition
from a merely moral obligation to a juridical obligation in the full sense is not
sudden; the notion of obligation flows gradually from one type to the other. The
reason for this is that the juridical effects
of a juridical obligation are separable from
one another; so we have different cases in
which some effects are present, others absent. Thus it happens that even obligations
which do not flow from the source of positive law, and for whose creditors no cause
of action against a debtor exists at law, are
in some way recognized in law or have
certain juridical effects.
In all positive rights one finds the sort
of natural obligations which, in teaching
or even in the statutes themselves, are
called natural obligations for the precise
reason that they do not arise from law,
but from a merely mbral or ethical duty or
from decency. Nevertheless, they are accepted in law because they do not remain
merely natural, but become more or less
juridical because of the effects that even

positive law recognizes in them, whether
those effects be few or many. The first
effect is that a debtor, against whom the
creditor cannot institute an action, if of his
own accord he nevertheless pays the debt,
cannot then bring an action of condiction
for unnecessary payment, 2 even if by chance
he mistakenly believed he was liable for
the debt at law, and because of this belief
paid the debt. Now the effect is more complete if to the creditor by natural obligation one concedes the right of compensation 3 and the right of retention. 4 Thus in
German law, after a statute of limitations
has run, while the natural obligation still
remains, the creditor can demand compensation if he is also bound to pay the debtor.
Furthermore, the fulfillment of the natural
obligation can be considered a necessary
act -

not a gratuity or donation -

and

thus the norms that determine the conditions and formalities for giving gifts do not
apply. Yet the payment of a natural debt
is often considered an unnecessary act because of the actio pauliana,5 which credThe action condictio indebiti is an action in personam based upon a quasi-contractual duty to restore the amount of a sum of money or other
thing paid by mistake; it is a formal claim of restitution. This article, abounding in civil law terms,
presents difficulties to a lawyer trained almost exclusively in common-law. When there is no suitable common-law equivalent for a civil law term,
there will be an attempted explanation in the footnotes.
3 "A reciprocal liberation between two persons
who are both creditors and debtors of each other.
...It resembles in many respects the common-law
set-off. The principal difference is that a set-off
must be pleaded to be effectual; whereas compensation is effectual without any such plea." I
BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914).
4 A lien.
2

5 There is at civil law an actio paidiana in rem
which is given to recover property alienated in
fraud of creditors on the assumption that aliena-
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itors can institute against debtors (wholly
"juridical") to prevent the waste of unnecessary expenditures by a debtor.
From this it follows that various grades
of juridical obligation exist which fall between an obligation from natural law alone
and an obligation which is in the full sense
juridical.
Other notions which juridical science
uses are analogous, such as those of subjective law (subjects of law or juridical
persons), juridical acts, etc. In law such
notions are ineffectual if they fail to signify
determined juridical effects. In fact, it can
generally be said that many juridical notions are formulated not to signify a necessary truth - not even deontological - but
to signify juridical effects proper to individual notions. The complexus or system of
those notions will be more perfect to the
extent that it has gathered to a focal point
in a simple, clear, and efficacious manner
various juridical facts and the effects which
follow from those facts. There are, so to
speak, notions which are operative, not
speculative, whether they concern an ordered knowledge of a single determined
juridical order, or the science of positive
law in general.
The ultimate explanation of the positive
nature of law, and hence, of juridical science, is itself the ultimate explanation of
positive law. Many modern juridical orders
are "closed systems." The codifications of
different sections of law in many nations
were the greatest but not the sole contributors to the formation of such a concept.
The essential element of the closed system
is that judges in formulating and writing
tion had not taken place. It was probably named
for Paulus, a third century Roman jurist and contemporary of Ulpian.

CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER

1961

opinions can appeal to no argument or
precept of law which is not found in positive law and in other sources of law, if,
and only to the extent that those other
sources are recognized by positive law.
In many older juridical orders this principle did not prevail; nor does it prevail
even today, since the judge has greater
freedom to find the decision which in each
case seems to him more just and equitable.
Where juridical relations have become more
complicated, however, particularly through
the evolution of commercial law, the definiteness of objective law has taken on such
value that it has been preferred to the
freedom of a judge to find the just result
in each case. To be sure, the law preferred has in most cases been just, but in
some cases it has not. An added reason is
that in a pluralistic society people do not
rely on the- opinion of each judge, but-as
far as possible they want to order all
things by a common law. Hence, the judge,
and consequently all lawyers, ought to
ground every right in statutes, and for
them no right is given outside of those
statutes.
No one fails to see that in modern developed states the closed system should not
be disapproved; on the contrary, it is absolutely inevitable. Indeed, it is of itself desirable that canon law become binding for
its own Catholic subjects everywhere even
in civil law, at least in special matters
such as matrimonial questions. However,
this cannot be achieved today by virtue
of canon law alone, still less by virtue of
the free opinion of d judge; but it can be
achieved by virtue of a concordat or a
positive law in which canon law is accepted
into and acquires the efficacy of civil law.
This effect, in other respects, is established
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rather than confirmed by the concordatory
law itself.
Once one admits a necessary positivity
of law as a methodological postulate for the
purpose of suitably distinguishing one science from another, it does not follow that
every ethical element must be banished
methodologically and systematically from
the science of law. Among those who have
strenuously defended the doctrine that ethical elements contained in positive law itself
should be subsumed under the notion of
law is the famous jurist, E. M. Meijers,
formerly a professor at the University of
Leiden, 6 recently deceased. His arguments
will be sketched briefly.
In lectures concerning the general doctrine of private civil law, Professor Meijers
frequently treated the question of whether
a juridical obligation is solely a norm whose
transgression causes determined reactions
of public authority and its agencies; or
whether it is not also, or rather primarily,
a norm which directly regards the person
himself as the subject of the obligation, so
as to furnish an ethical motive for acting
according to the norm, even prescinding
from the reaction of authority.
There is no doubt that, objectively speaking, juridical elements have that ethical
6 Meijers, Edward Maurice (1880-1954),

LL.D.,

University of Amsterdam (1903); Professor of
Civil Law and Private International Law in the
University of Leiden (1910-1950). As president
of the Royal Dutch Academy of Science (19451949) he started work on a new civil code, the
commission of which had been granted to him by
Royal Decree (April 25, 1947). His writings include, among others: L'HISTOIRE DE PRINCIPES
FONDAMENTAUX

DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

.A PARTIR DU MOYEN AGE

PRIVE

(1934). He drew up the

bill of the treaty about the introduction into Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg of a uniform
law concerning private international law (1951).
WINKLER PRINs ENCYCLOPAEDIA.

value. This, not only in so far as those
precepts flow directly from ethical norms,
such as "thou shalt not steal," or simply
fall back on those norms such as "good
morals," "good faith," "equity," "decency,"
etc., but also in so far as they are the socalled heteronomous norms, mere positive
law, formulated by statute, custom, and
prevailing judicial decisions. One who
breaks the law, then, acts imprudently not
only because authority will react on him
unpleasantly; but also he acts unethically.
The responsible citizen.holds law and statute in such high regard that they furnish
him with a motive of acting according to
them.
This is an objective truth which is clear
to all conscientious men. There is, however, another question (merely of system
or method) of whether the ethical force
of a juridical precept should be considered
the object of juridical science, and be subsumed under the notion of law, or rather,
should the notion of law be restricted to
obtaining effects by the intervention or coercion of public authority, leaving the ethical element to ethics and the students of
ethics?
If the second method is accepted, one
must say that law in its entirety consists in
the reactions of public authority caused
by the acts of the subjects of law. Precepts given to the citizens considered juridically are not precepts, but merely communications or announcements given to them
telling under what conditions what sort of
interventions of judges or other agencies of
the state can be expected. If certain acts
are performed, definite results will follow.
Nothing more. Juridically speaking, it is a
matter of indifference what happens then,
whether it be observance or violation of
the norms; juridically speaking, it is impor-
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tant only that the previously announced
effects will follow accurately.
Professor Meijers strenuously defended
the methodological soundness of subsuming
the ethical element under the notion of law
or under the object of juridical science.
In the first place, the value of every juridical order relies more. on the moral
force of precepts than on fear of the reactions of the state's agencies. But it is not
a scientifically sound method to separate
norms in so far as they are the conditions
for the intervention of authority from
norms in so far as they have moral force,
because this is the special foundation of
the real value of law.
On the other hand, that separation can
harm the dignity and authority of law, if
not so much logically, then at least practically. If the proper note of law and its
norms consists in rules which define the
conditions under which public force can be
invoked or applied, it will be difficult to
avoid the conclusion that literally every
precept issued by a ruler in the necessary
form is law, whatever may be its status
concerning ethical value; or, further, that
law is whatever a usurper, tyrant, or criminal leader orders done as long as they have
the power to force men to observe their
commands. Certainly those who admit this
consequence will not maintain that citizens
are held to obey an unjust precept of a
ruler or the precepts of a usurper, a tyrant,
or a criminal leader. The extent to which
they are held to obey or not obey the law
is, however, a question which concerns
moralists, not jurists. This solution, however, leaves something to be desired.
It is not sound methodologically, in one
and the same reality, to separate substance
or what is primary from what is consequent
or secondary and to assign those things to
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different sciences. The object of juridical
science is positive law. That object, however, really contains ethical elements which
are also important. Consequently juridical
science should consider those elements too.
The complex system of public coercion in
its entirety subserves the protection and
conservation of a juridical order which, of
itself, aims directly at protecting and promoting justice, peace, good morals, security
and, in general, both human and ethical
social welfare. If that system of coercion is
consistently dissociated from its singular
and immediate end, again not by a logical
necessity but practically, one might fear
that that essential and intrinsic finality may
be forgotten and finally lead to a definition
of juridical science which would sound
something like this: "the science of law is
that science which teaches the social means
by which men may be more efficaciously
forced to do something"; or "the object of
juridical science is the machinery of force
in the hands of those who are stronger in
a society." If juridical science would put
the normative strength of law in first place
in its own formal object, and relegate the
coercive function to second place, it would
choose a much safer way to a fuller understanding of its object, which is positive law.
A second conception or notion of law
generally carries with it other specific juridical notions and another method for defining them. Let us take certain examples.
Questions of this sort are posed by
jurists: if an heir accepts an inheritance
under benefit of inventory, 7 does he have
the obligation of paying the debts of the
testator; or if someone is made the propri7 An heir, either testamentary or ab intestato, who
had doubts about accepting or refusing could accept with benefit of inventory. If he did so, he
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etor of some real property encumbered by
a mortgage, does he have the obligation of
paying the debt for which the mortgage
was given?
Lawyers, in order to respond to questions of this sort, usually inquire immediately into the legal effects which will follow
if the beneficiary heir or proprietor does
not pay the debts. Can he be forced by a
court order to make restitution to the creditors for damages resulting from the unpaid
debts? Can the creditors ask the judge to
declare them bankrupt? Or, if the heir or
proprietor has mistakenly paid the debts,
can he, with the support of the judge, seek
to regain the sum?
Professor Meijers rejected this method,
which is still followed in different jurisdictions both by lawyers and judges. One
should first carefully determine whether the
primary norm is present, namely: "you
are held to pay the debt." Are the beneficiary heirs or proprietors of goods which are
encumbered by the mortgages of other
debtors subject to censure if they do not
pay the debt? Only if this norm were present, which immediately regards the subjects, could the remaining legal effects be
said to spring from their obligation.
In any case, if the heir or the proprietor
does not pay the debt, the creditors can
seek an execution of the inheritance or the
real property encumbered by the mortgage.
Indeed, it follows then that it is of interest
to the heir or the proprietor that the debt
be paid, but he is not obligated to do this.
By no means are they acting unethically if
they allow the inheritance or the real prophad to begin within a stated number of days after
becoming aware of his right to claim the inheritance; and the inventory then had to be completed
in a definite time. By satisfying these requirements,
the heir escaped liability for the debts of the deceased beyond the extent of the assets.

erty to be sequestered without paying anything for it themselves.
In the statutes themselves, for the most
part, a more accurate method in drafting
them would be desirable. Often the same
words are used in norms which intend to
impose obligations as in those which do
not have that intention. For instance, if a
statute so provides, the plaintiff in a trial
must prove the facts alleged by him. The
plaintiff who fails to prove the facts must
certainly suffer the unpleasant consequences
which the statute attaches to the failure of
proof; but the statute by no means wishes
to declare that plaintiff subject to censure
who is neither able nor willing to give
proof. Similarly, if a statute provides that
the creditor should prevent or mitigate the
damage or delay of the debtor when he can
prevent it without excessive labor or expense, it does not intend to establish a norm
which looks directly to the creditor as
though he would do some injustice by not
mitigating the damage. It merely wishes
to decide that restitution for the loss is not
to be made by the debtor. One could hope
that these statutes would more accurately
distinguish between norms which intend to
impose an obligation on subjects, and
norms which are really nothing but the
conditions for juridical effects.
A significant reason why jurists in practice separate the ethical element from juridical duty and judicial obligation is this:
in recent laws of various jurisdictions the
insane, infants, and juridical persons succeed to obligations which the representative persons had before them. The obligation is considered to remain the same and
to pass from one subject to the other. It
seems difficult to conceive of such a passage if the notion of obligation also includes, 6r rather primarily includes, an
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ethical element or norm according to which
the subject is bound in conscience in cases
where that subject lacks a conscience. Thus,
in older laws guardians or trustees or executors of a will were considered the subjects
of obligations. The modern construction
which gives obligations directly to the insane, infants, and juridical persons is preferable, because it orders juridical effects
more simply and easily.
Nothing prevents the use of this modern
construction, however, even if the notion of
juridical obligation contains a norm of acting for the subject. For if the juridical
effects of the obligation of an unwitting
subject are the same as the effects of an
intelligent subject, the practical nature itself
of juridical notions demands that an "unknown obligation" be subsumed under the
notion of a normal obligation. This can
be done either with the aid of a fiction of
law, or by admitting an imperfect analogy
of obligation or by other means which in
objective meaning would amount substantively to the same thing. But by no means
are we forced to remove the ethical element from the notion of juridical obligation in general for the sole reason that we
sometimes use this notion independently of
the ethical element.
The difference between the two conceptions of law and obligation appears clearly
in the distinction which jurists make between primary and secondary obligations.
A primary obligation is that which directly and of itself constitutes a norm of
acting for the subject, such as paying a
debt, fulfilling a contract, etc.
A secondary obligation is that by which
someone, if he has acted contrary to the
primary norm, is bound to make restitution to a creditor for any damage arising
from an unpaid debt or to another con-
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tracting party from an unfulfilled contract,
to pay a fine, or to remove something
constructed unlawfully in the field of another, etc.
A secondary obligation does not exist
for its own sake, but for the sake of a primary obligation - for urging its execution.
The primary obligation itself, however, is
often not subject to the coercion of public
authority; only the secondary obligation is.
This distinction, obvious and clear
enough, is completely reversed by those
who place the notion of law in coercion
alone. The secondary obligation is, so they
say, to pay the debt or to fulfill the contract. This juridical obligation is sufficiently
unimportant since it does not have an immediate juridical effect, namely, intervention of the agencies of the state. There
are those who have called the contract
a "juridical non-entity" (ein juristisches
Nichts), since the only notable effect it
would have in law would be an action to
recover damages if the contract itself is
breached. We draw closer to the field of
law now if that secondary obligation does
not have a necessary effect. For indeed
there arises then a genuine juridical obligation which should be called primary, because it is immediately subject to public
coercion.
Again, if this method were carried to
its-logical conclusion, the last and only true
juridical obligation would be that which,
following the decision of the judge and its
execution, we are forced by physical necessity to fulfill. For in this method, obligations are derived from the ability to coerce;
the ability to coerce is not derived from
a pre-existing obligation.
Thus, certain jurists, in other respects
outstanding, have thought that a bond
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posted by a guardian of a minor ward at
the beginning of his accepted duties is accessory of the obligation to make restitution for the damage if he maladministered
the property of the ward. It would then be
a bond posted for a future possible debt -"
as if it were the primary obligation of the
guardian to make restitution for the loss
resulting from a poor administration. Such
a bond seeks rather to insure the faithful
execution of the primary and immediate
obligation, that of careful administration.
The same reversal is significant in definitions of positive rights. There are, for
example, those who place the right of real
property in the fact that the possessor has
an action against those who unlawfully
disturb his possession. This, as if he had not
primarily had a right that others might not
unlawfully disturb his possession!
There is also a significant diversity in
the notion of law and obligation in solving
the question of whether a judicial decision
is declarative of existing law, or constitutive of new law.
Those who favor the opinion which conceives rights and juridical obligations primarily as conditions for public coercion
consider a definitive decision (i.e., a res
judicata whose truth is presumed by a presumption of law and according to law) constitutive of right and obligation. For the
norm which public coercion follows is the
decision of the judge, whether this decision
concurs with prior precedents or not. Certainly the debtor will have the ethical obligation to pay the debt which actually
existed; but the juridical obligation is now
urged by the decision alone. The decision
creates the right; it does not merely declare it.
The opinion which sees in juridical obligation something more than the effects of

a threatened public coercion will not judge
in this manner. Judicial decision does not
have a value apart from the cases about
which it judges. If the decision is correct,
it adds a measure of coercion for enforcing
the pre-existing obligation. If it is not correct, the obligation is not of itself extinguished, but per accidens no coercive
measure is granted to enforce that obligation. The right of a creditor does not
depend on the decision. The obligation of
a debtor, however, after a definitive decision which does not grant a means of
coercion to the creditor for enforcing the
obligation, should be called not only ethical, but also juridical, provided only that
it may continue to have certain juridical
effects. It is enough, for instance, that a
payment made by a debtor whom a decision mistakenly absolved from debt is not
considered a gratuitous act or a gift; moreover, if it is not a donation, then it is a
restitution of what someone received by
virtue of an unjust decision. Or is it
enough that a defendant who had previously won a decision favorable to himself,
but acknowledges afterwards in a later suit
that that decision was erroneous, can still
be condemned. And, conversely, it is
enough that the execution of an erroneous
decision, carried into effect by one who is
aware of this error and then acknowledges
his awareness, furnishes cause to prevent
him from profiting from that unjust aet. But
if the ethical obligation, still existing after
the erroneous decision, is absolutely rnsupported by any positive juridical measure,
then truly it may well be called merely
ethical and no longer juridical, since the
entire obligation is now treated outside the
field of positive law, and hence lies outside
the object of juridical science.
Finally, there is a significant diversity
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in the notion of law in the following problem. We have many juridical facts which
have juridical effects with a retroactive
force. In many cases this retroactivity dependsupon the complaint of those who are
interested parties. Thus, in recognizing natural sons, the complaint of the father establishes the paternity retroactively to the
moment of the birth of the son. In accepting or repudiating inheritances, the complaint of the heir has the effect of acceptance or repudiation- retroactively to the
moment at which the testator died. In rescinding bilateral contracts for the poor
performance of one of the parties, the complaint of the other party has the effect of
rescission retroactively to the moment of
the drawing up of the contract. In repayment of joint loans, the complaint of one
debtor has the effect of compensation retroactively to the moment at which the debt
existed jointly, etc. In many cases the question can be posed: are those effects the
effects of the complaint which has retroactive force, or are they the effects of the
very fact from which they are considered
to originate; that is, the coexistence of the
two debts, the poor performance, and the
birth of the son?
The same question can be posed in all
those cases in which the judge is obliged
to allow juridical effects of juridical actions,
not by virtue of his duty as judge, but only
when one who is an interested party pleads
those facts, such as the statute of limitations once the time prescribed in the statute has run. Is the debt abolished by the
statute, or, rather, by the complaint of that
person who pleaded the statute?
One who is of the opinion that right consists in the ability to exert force will even
more readily believe that complaints are
the immediate causes of effects, since they
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themselves are the immediate conditions
for the forceful intervention of public authority. On the contrary, one who is of the
opinion that rights and juridical obligations
have their own immediate value indepen"dently of public coercion will believe rather
that the complaints are not necessarily the
causes of juridical effects, but can even
be the mere conditions that enable someone
to secure public protection for the insurance and protection of his rights which he
has already derived from another source.
The requirement for a complaint, by itself,
in order that effects may be recognized in
law or before a judge, does not prove that
those effects necessarily come from the
complaint.
From the explanation already given it
seems the following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. Juridical ontological positivism, which
consists in an unwillingness to admit the
very existence of ethical norms, either in
the matter of law or of justice, is inadmissible for Catholic jurists.
2. Juridical methodological positivism,
which consists in wishing to restrict the
name and notion of law to those phenomena only whose effects, enforcible with the
aid of the public agencies of the state, are
given by positive law, and in so far as
they are given, is not entirely inadmissible
for Catholic jurists, because in and of itself
it does not contain any thesis which contradicts sound Catholic doctrine.
If this is still on the whole less satisfactory, it is for practical reasons and reasons of scientific methodology. For it is not
fitting methodologically that a system of
public enforcement, which depends intrinsically on and is wholly ordered to a system of rights and obligations, should be
considered only in itself, and made the
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formal object of juridical science with its
rights and obligations in so far as they
have ethical and human value left to other
disciplines. Practically speaking, this method
should be discouraged. For if young students of juridical science - students who
scarcely receive any training in the study of
ethics and moral theology - begin their
study according to that method, certainly
their knowledge of the juridical order and
its true value will remain stunted and imperfect.
3. Juridical methodological positivism,
which consists in limiting law and the- study
of law to positive law, in such a way, however, that the ethical elements which the
juridical order itself contains may be encompassed in that formal object, seems to
be a wholly appropriate method that should
be considered by Catholic jurists. Modem
juridical science must of necessity be positive, because the rights themselves are
positive or closed systems which do not
admit of other sources of right except
positive law.
However, since even the norms of positive law primarily and immediately regard
persons, the subjects of rights and obligations for whom law stands as an ethical
motive for acting, and only secondarily regard the means of public enforcement, it
follows:
1. Negatively: a norm which lacks the
normative value for human acts, whether
because it is not given by legitimate authority, or because it is repugnant to higher

principles of ethics or morals, preferably
should not be called law; nor is it fitting
that it be subsumed under the notion of
law, even though it has the effect of enforcement in a given positive juridical order.
2. Positively: the normative value of positive law falls under the formal object of
juridical science. Therefore it is the duty
of jurists not only to inquire into the means
which insure the observance of rights and
obligations, but even more to inquire into
the value of those rights and obligations
themselves by judging their justice, equity,
prudence, clarity, etc.
A certain corollary will perhaps not be
entirely superfluous. If the ethical aspects
of laws and their precepts also constitute
part of the formal object of juridical science, it should be not only desirable but
even necessary for the scientific training
of jurists that even students of civil law
be instructed carefully in the science of
ethics and its method, especially to the
extent that it regards the treatment of law
and justice. This postulate, moreover, will
benefit not only the science of law; it will
be no less profitable to the science of
ethics and its treatment of law and justice.
For it is one thing to have heard in schools
and read in books about the norms of justice, and quite another to engage in a practice which must deal exclusively in safeguarding .and promoting law and justice. In
this teaching, then, many of the finest and
most useful works of Catholic action still
remain the hope and vision of the future.

